THE FIRST DAY AT GETTYSBURG
By Henry Hunt Major General USA

The battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville raised the confidence of the
Confederate Army of Northern Virginia to such a height as to cause its subordinate
officers and soldiers to believe that, as opposed to the Army of the Potomac, they
were equal to any demand that could be made upon them.  their belief in the
superiority of the Southerner to the Northerner as a fighter was no longer, as at the
beginning of the war, a mere provincial conceit, for it was now supported by signal
successes in the field.  On each of these two occasions the Army of the Potomac had
been recently reorganized under a new general, presumably abler than his
predecessor and possessing the confidence of the War Department, and the results
were crowning victories for the Confederates.  Yet at Fredericksburg defeat was not
owing to any lack of fighting qualities on the part of the Federal soldiers, but rather
to defective leadership.

At Chancellorsville both qualities were called in question.  In none of the previous
battles between these armies had the disparity of numbers been so great.  The federal
general had taken the initiative, his plan of operations was excellent, and his troops
were eager for battle.  The Confederates could at first oppose but a portion of their
inferior force to the attack of greatly superior numbers, and the boast of the Federal
commander, that "The Army of Northern Virginia was the legitimate property of
the Army of the Potomac," seemed in a fair way to be justified, when at first contact
the advantages already gained were thrown away by the assumption of a timid,
defensive attitude.  Lee's bold offensive, which followed immediately on this
exhibition of weakness, the consequent rout of a Federal army-corps, and the
subsequent retreat of the whole Army, a large portion of which had not been
engaged, confirmed the exultant Confederates in their conviction--which now
became an article of faith--that both in combat and in generalship the superiority of
the southerner was fully established.  The Federal soldiers returned from
Chancellorsville to their camps on the northern bank of the Rappahannock,
mortified and incensed at finding themselves, through no fault of their own, in the
condition of having in a offensive campaign lost the battle without fighting, exempt
when the enemy forced it upon them.

Yet in this battle the northern soldier fought well.  Under the circumstances no men
could have withstood such a sudden attack as that made by "Stonewall"  Jackson on
the flank and rear of the Eleventh Corps; but as soon As Jackson encountered troops
in condition for action, his pursuit checked and he was brought to a stand.  The
panic did not extend beyond the routed corps, nor to all of that, for its artillery and
so much of its infantry as could form a proper line did their duty, and the army, far
from being "demoralized" by this mishap, simply ridiculed the corps, which from its
supposed want of vigilance, had allowed itself to be surprised in a position in which
it could not fight.  The surprise itself was not the fault of the troops, and in
subsequent battles the corps redeemed its reputation.  Both armies were composed
in the main of Americans, and there was little more difference between their men
and than might be found between those of either army at different periods, or under
varying circumstances; for although high bounties had already brought into the
Federal ranks an inferior element which swelled the muster-rolls and the number
of stragglers, "bounty jumping" had not yet become a regular business. 

The morale of the Confederate army was, however, much higher at this time than
that of its adversary.  It was composed of men not less patriotic, many of whom had
gone into war with reluctance, but who now felt that they were defending their
homes.  They were by this time nearly all veterans, led by officers having the
confidence of their Government, which took pains to inspire its soldiers with the
same feeling.  Their successes were extolled and magnified, their reverses palliated
or ignored.  Exaggerations as to the relative numbers of the troops had been
common enough on both sides, but those indulged in at the sought had been
echoed, sometimes suggested, in the North by a portion of the press and people, so
that friends and enemies united in inspiring the Confederate soldier a belief in
himself and a contempt for his enemy.  In the army of the Potomac it was different;
the proportion of veterans was much smaller; a cessation of recruiting at the very
beginning of active operations, when men were easily attainable to supply losses in
existing regiments, had been followed, as emergencies arose, by new levies, for short
periods of service , and in new organizations of which could not readily be
assimilated by older troops.  Moreover their were special difficulties.  The army of
the Potomac was not in favor at the War Department.  Rarely, if ever, had it heard a
word of official commendation after a success, or of sympathy or encouragement
after a defeat.  From the very beginning its camps had been filled with imputations
and charges against its leaders, who were accused on the streets, by the press, in
Congress, and even in the War Department itself, and after victories as well as after
defeats, not only of incapacity or misconduct, but sometimes of "disloyalty" to their
superiors, civil and military, and even to the cause for which they fought.  These
accusations were followed or accompanied by frequent changes of commanders of
the army, of army-corps, and even of divisions.  Under such circumstances, but little
confidence could be felt by the troops, either in the wisdom of a war office which
seemed to change its favorites with the caprice of a croquette, or in the capacity of
new generals who followed each other in such rapid succession.  But it is do to that
patient and sorely tried army, to say that the spirit of both officers and men was of
the best, and their devotion to duty unconquerable.  The army itself had originally
been so admirably disciplined and tempered, that their always remained to it a firm
self-reliance and a stern sense of duty and honor that was proof against its many
discouragements.  In battle it always aquatinted itself well and displayed the highest
soldierly qualities, no matter who commanded it whence it came.  Chancellorsville
furnishes no exemption to this assertion, nor evidence of inferiority of the
Northern to the Southern soldier, but it does furnish striking illustrations of
Napoleon's well-known saying, "In war men are nothing, a man is everything."

General Lee, who felt great confidence in his own troops, and overrated the effects of
successive reverses on the federal soldiers, now resolved to assume the offensive,
for he knew to remain on the defensive would in the end force him back on
Richmond.  He determined, therefore, in case the Army of the Potomac could not be
brought to action under favorable circumstances in Virginia, to transfer, if
permitted, the field of operations to Northern soil, where a victory promptly
followed up might give him possession of Baltimore or Washington, and perhaps
lead to the recognition of the Confederacy by foreign powers.  The valley of the
Shenandoah offered a safe line of operations; the Federal troops occupying it were
rather a bait than an obstacle, and to capture or destroy them seemed quite practical
to one who controlled absolutely all Confederate troops within the sphere of his
operations.  The sharp lesson he had administered the previous year had not been
heeded by the Federal War office; an opportunity now offered to repeat it, and he
took his measures accordingly.  In case his Government would not consent to a
bolder offensive, he could at least clear the valley of Virginia of the enemy,--a
distinct operation, yet a necessary preliminary to an invasion of the North.  This
work was assigned to Lieutenant-General Ewell, an able officer, in every way
qualified for such an enterprise.

In anticipation of the new campaign, Lee's army was strengthened and reorganized
into three army-corps of three divisions each.  Each division consisted of four
brigades, except Rodes's and Anderson's, which had five each, and Pickett's, which
had three at Gettysburg,-- in all, thirty-seven infantry brigades.  The cavalry were the
select troops of the Confederacy.  Officers and men had been accustomed all their
lives to the use of horses and arms, "and to the very end the best blood in the land
rode after Stuart, Hampton, and the Lees."  They were now organized as a division ,
under Major-General J.E.B. Stuart, consisting of the six brigades of Hampton,
Robertson, Fitzhugh Lee, Jenkins, W.E. Jones, and W.H.F. Lee, and six batteries of
horse-artillery under Major R.F. Beckman.  To these should be added Imboden's
command, a strong brigade of over 2000 effective horsemen and a battery of horse-
artillery, which had been operating in the mountain county and was now near
Staunton, awaiting orders.  The artillery had recently received an excellent
organization under its commandant-in-chief, General Pendleton.  It consisted,
besides the horse-artillery, of fifteen so-called "battalions," each of four batteries,
with one lieutenant-colonel and a major.  To each army-corps were attached five
battalions, one for each division and two as a reserve, the whole under a colonel  as
a chief of artillery.  The total number of batteries was 69, of guns 287, of which 30
were with the Cavalry.  With few exceptions the batteries were of four guns each. 
The army was commanded by a full general, each army-corps, except the artillery, by
a lieutenant-general, each division by a major-general, each brigade, except two, by
brigadier-generals.  Nearly all these officers were veterans of proved ability and
many had served in the Mexican war.

In the Army of the Potomac the discharge of 58 regiments had reduced its strengths
since Chancellorsville by 25,000 effective, partly replaced by 5 brigades numbering
less than 12,000  men.  At the battle of Gettysburg the 7 army-corps consisted of  19
infantry divisions, 7 of which had 2 brigades, 11 had 3, and 1 had 4; in all 51 brigades. 
The army and army-corps were commanded by major-generals, the divisions by 3
major-generals and 16 brigadier-generals, the infantry brigades by 22 brigadier-
generals and 29 colonels.  The average strength of army-corps and divisions was
about half that of the Confederates, a fact that should be kept in mind, or terms will
be misleading. The cavalry had been raised under disadvantages.  Men accustomed
to the use of both horses and arms were comparatively few in the North and
required training in everything that was necessary to make a trooper. The theater of
war was not considered favorable for cavalry, and it was distributed to the various
headquarters for escort duty, guards, and orderlies.  It was not until 1863 that it was
united under General Pleasonton in a corps consisting of three weak divisions,
Buford's, D. McM. Gregg's, and Duffie's, afterward consolidated into two, Stahel's
cavalry, which joined at Frederick, June 28, becoming the third division.  The corps
was then organized as follows:  First Division, Buford:  brigades, Gamble, Devin,
Merritt; Second Division, Gregg:  brigades, McIntosh, Huey, J. Irving Gregg; Third
Division, Kilpatrick: brigades, Farnsworth, Custer.  The divisions and three of the
brigades were commanded by brigadier-generals, the five brigades by colonels.  To
the cavalry were attached Robertson's and Tinball's brigades of horse-artillery. 
Under excellent chiefs and the spirit created by its new organization, the Federal
cavalry soon rivaled that of the Confederates.

The field-artillery was in unsatisfactory condition.  The high reputation it had
gained in Mexico was followed by the active and persistent hostility of the War
Department, which almost immediately dismounted three-fourths of its authorized
batteries.  Congress in 1853 made special provision for remounting them as schools
of instruction for the whole arm, a duty which the war Department on shallow
pretexts evaded.  Again in 1861 Congress amply provided for the proper
organization and command of the artillery in the field, but as there was no chief nor
special administration for the arm, and no regulations for its government, its
organization, control, and direction were left to the fancies of the various army
commanders.   General officers were practically denied it, and in 1862 the war
Department announced in orders that field-officers of artillery were an unnecessary
expense and their muster into service forbidden.  Promotion necessarily ceased, and
such able artillerists as Hays, DeRussy, Getty, Gibbon, Griffon and Ayers could only
receive promotion by transfer to the infantry of cavalry.  No adequate measures
were taken for the supply of recruits, and the batteries were frequently dependent on
the troops to which they were attached for men enough to work their guns in battle. 
For battery-draft they were often glad to get the refuse horses after the ambulance
and quartermasters' trains were supplied.  Still, many of the batteries attained a high
degree of excellence, due mainly to the self-sacrifice, courage, and intelligence of
their officers and men.

On taking command of the army, General hooker had transferred the military
command of the artillery to his own headquarters, to be resumed by the chief of
artillery only under specific orders and for special occasions, which resulted in such
mismanagement and confusion at Chancellorsville that he consented to organize
the artillery into brigades.  This was a decided improvement, which would have
been greater if the brigade commanders had held adequate rank.  As it was, there
was no artillery commandant-in-chief for months before the battle of Gettysburg,
and of the 14 brigades 4 were commanded by field-officers, 9 by captains, and 1 by a
lieutenant, taken from their batteries for the purpose.  The number of field-batteries
at Gettysburg was 65, of guns, 370, of which 212 were with the infantry, 50 with the
cavalry, 108 in the reserve.  The disadvantages under which the artillery labored all
through the war, from want of proper regulations, supervision, and command were
simply disgraceful to our army administration from the close of the Mexican to that
of the Civil war, and caused an unnecessary expenditure of both blood and treasure.

It will be perceived by comparison that the organization of the Army of the Potomac
was at this period in every way inferior to that of its adversary.  The army-corps and
divisions were too numerous and too weak.  They required too many commanders
and staffs, and this imposed unnecessary burdens on the general-in-chief , who was
often compelled to place several army-corps under the commander of one of them ,
thus reproducing the much abused "grand divisions" of Burnside, under every
possible disadvantage.  Had the number of infantry corps been reduced to four at
mast, and the division to twelve, the army would have been more manageable and
better commanded, and the artillery, without any loss, but rather a gain of efficiency,
would have been reduced by a dozen of fifteen batteries.

Early in June Lee's army began to move, and by the 8th Longstreet's and Ewell"s
corps had joined Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper.  A.P. Hill's corps was left in
observation at Fredericksburg; and so skillfully were the changes concealed that
Hooker, believing that all the enemy's infantry were still near that town, ordered
Pleasonton to beat up Stuart's camps at Culpeper, and get information as to the
enemy's position and proposed movements.  For these purposes he gave
Pleasonton two small brigades of infantry, 3000 men under Generals Ames and
Russell, which carried his total force of 10,981.  They were echeloned along the
railroad, which crosses the river at Rappahannock Station, and runs thence ten
miles to Culpeper.  About midway is Brady Station a few hundred yards north of
which is Fleetwood Hill.  Dividing his force equally, Pleasonton ordered Buford and
Ames to cross at Beverly Ford, and Gregg, Duffie, and Russel at Kelly's Ford.  All
were to march to Brady Station, Duffie being thrown out to Stevensburg, seven
miles east of Culpeper, to watch the Fredericksburg road.  Then the whole force was
to move on to Culpeper.  On the 8th, General Lee, having sent Jenkin's brigade as
Ewell's advance into the valley, reviewed the other 5 brigades of Stuart, 10,292
combatants, on the plains near Brady Station.  After the review they were
distributed in the neighborhood with a view to crossing the Rappahannock on the
9th, Stuart establishing his headquarters at Fleetwood.  Accident had thus disposed
his forces in the most favorable manner to meet Pleasonton's converging
movements.

At daybreak Buford crossed and drove the enemy's pickets from the ford back to the
main body, near St. James church.  Stuart, on first report  of the crossing, sent
Robertson's brigade toward Kelly's to watch that ford, and Colonel M.C. Butler's 2d
South Carolina to Brady Station.  He himself took the command at the church,
where he was attacked by Buford.  At Brady Station W. H. F. Lee was wounded, and
Colonel Chambliss took command of his brigade.  Meantime Gregg had crossed at
Kelly's Ford, and Duffie, leading, took a southerly road, by which he missed
Robertson's brigade.  Learning that Duffie's advance had reached Stevensburg and
that Buford was heavily engaged, Gregg pushed direct for Brady Station, sending
orders to Duffie to follow his movement.  Stuart, notified of his approach, had sent
in haste some artillery and two of Jones's regiments to Fleetwood, and Colonel
Butler started at once for Stevensburg, followed soon after by Wickham's 4th
Virginia.  On their approach two squadrons of the 6th Ohio, in occupation of the
place, fell back skirmishing.  Duffie sent two regiments to their aid, and after a
severe action, mainly with the 2d South Carolina, reoccupied the village.  In this
action Colonel butler lost a leg, and his lieutenant-colonel, Hampton, was killed.

On Gregg's arrival near Brady Station the enemy appeared to be in large force, with
artillery, on and about Fleetwood Hill.  He promptly ordered an attack; the hill was
carried, and the two regiments sent by Stuart were driven back.  Buford now
attacked vigorously and gained ground steadily,  for Stuart had to reinforce his
troops at Fleetwood from the church.  In the struggles that followed, the hill several
times changed masters; but as Duffie did not make his appearance, Greg was finally
overmatched and withdrew, leaving three of his guns, two of them disabled, in the
enemy's hands, nearly all of their horses being killed and most of their cannoneers
hors de combat.  There were some demonstrations of pursuit, but the approach of
Buford's reserve brigade stopped them.  Duffie finally came up and Gregg reported
to Pleasonton, informing him of the approach of Confederate infantry from
Culpeper.  Pleasonton, who had captured some important dispatches and orders,
now considered his mission accomplished, and ordered a withdrawal of his whole
command.  This was effected leisurely and without molestation.  Gregg recrossed at
Rappahannock Station, Buford at Beverly Ford, and at sunset the river again flowed
between opposing forces.  Stuart reports his losses at 485, of whom 301 were killed or
wounded.  Pleasonton reports an aggregate loss(exclusive of Duffies, which would
not exceed 25) of 907, of whom 421 were killed or wounded.  In nearly all the
previous so-called "cavalry" actions, the troops had fought as dismounted dragoons. 
This was in the main a true cavalry battle, and enabled the Federals to dispute the
superiority hitherto claimed by, and conceded to, the Confederate cavalry.  In this
respect the affair was an important one.  It did not however delay Lee's designs on
the valley; he had already sent Imboden toward Cumberland to destroy the railroad
and canal from that place to Martinsburg.

Milroy's federal division, about 9000 strong, occupied Winchester, with
McRenolds's brigade in observation at Berryville.  Kelley's division of about 10,000
men was at Harpers Ferry, with a detachment  1200 infantry and a battery under
Colonel B. F. Smith at Martinsburg.  On the night of June 11, Milroy received
instructions to join  kelley, but, reporting that he could hold Winchester, was
authorized to remain there.  Ewell, leaving Brandy Station June 10th, reached
Cedarville via Chester Gap on the evening of the 12th, whence he detached Jenkins
and Rodes to capture McRenolds, who, discovering there approach, withdrew to
Winchester.  They then pushed on to Martinsburg, and on the 14th drove out the
garrison.  Smith's infantry crossed the Potomac  at Shepardstown, and made its way
to Maryland heights; his artillery retreated by the Williamsport road, was pursued,
and lost five guns.  

Meanwhile Ewell, with Early's and Edward Johnson's divisions, marched direct on
Winchester.  Arriving in the neighborhood on the evening of the 13th, he ordered
early on the 14th to leave a brigade in observation on the south of the town, move
his main force under cover of the hills to the northwestern side, and seize the
outworks which commanded the main fort.  He also ordered Johnson to deploy  his
division on the east of town, so as to divert attention from Early.  this was so
successfully done that the latter placed, unperceived, twenty guns and an assaulting
column in position, and at 6 p.m., by a sudden attack, carried the outworks, driving
the garrisons into the body of the place.  This capture was a complete surprise, and
Milroy called a council of war, which he decided on an immediate retreat,
abandoning the artillery and wagons.  Ewell had anticipated this, and ordered
Johnson to occupy with a brigade a position on the Martinsburg pike, north of
Winchester.  The retreat commenced at 2 a.m. of the 15th, and after proceeding three
or four miles, the advance encountered Johnson's troops, attacked vigorously, and
at first successfully, but, the enemy receiving reenforcements, a hard fight ensued in
which the Federals lost heavily.  The retreat was then continued; the troops
separated in the darkness, one portion reaching harper's ferry, another crossing the
Potomac at Hancock.  On the 15th Ewell crossed the river, occupied Hagerstown and
sharpsburg, and sent Jenkin's cavalry to Chambersburg to collect supplies.  On the
17th the garrison of Harper's Ferry was removed to Maryland Heights, and the
valley of the Shenandoah was cleared of Federal troops.  In these brilliant operations
general lee claims for Ewell the capture of 4000 prisoners and small-arms, 28 pieces
of artillery, 11 colors, 300 loaded wagons, as many horses, and a considerable
quantity of stores of all descriptions, the entire Confederate loss, killed, wounded,
and missing, being 269.

These operations indicate on the part of General Lee either contempt for his
opponent, or a belief that the chronic terror of The War Department for the safety of
Washington could be safely relied upon to paralyze his movements,--or both.  On
no other reasonable hypothesis can we account for his stretching his army from
Fredicksburg to Williamsport, with his enemy concentrated on one flank, and on
the shortest road to Richmond.

General Hooker's instructions were to keep always in view the safety of
Washington and Harper's Ferry, and this necessarily subordinated his operations to
those of the enemey.  On June 5th he reported that in case Lee moved via Culpeper
toward the Potomac with his main body , leaving a corps at Fredericksburg, he
should consider it his duty to attack the latter, and asked if that would be within the
spirit of his instructions.  In reply he was warned against such a course, and its
dangers to Washington and Harper's Ferry were pointed out.  On June 10th learning
that Lee was in motion, and that there were but few troops in Richmond, he
proposed an immediate march on that place, from which after capturing it, he could
send the disposable part of the force to any threatened point north of the Potomac,
and was informed that Lee's army, and not Richmond, was his true objective.